Abstract: Combine two games of incomplete information, one after the other, for which their equilibria are established through very different methods; will the resulting composite game have an equilibrium? Let Γ be the set of probability distributions on the pathways of play of the first game and for every subset C that can be held in common knowledge at the conclusion of the first game and γ ∈ Γ let γ|C be the conditional probability distribution on C, given that it is well defined. If the first game has a finite game tree with perfect recall and the second game has an equilibrium payoff correspondence that is non-empty, upper-semi-continous and convex valued as a function of γ|C for every such C, then the answer is yes. To prove this, the concept of a myopic equilibrium is introduced, something independent of the context of games of incomplete information.
Introduction
This following game inspired this work. Nature chooses a state k from a finite set K according to some probability distribution p 0 ∈ ∆(K). There are two Players, Player One and Player Two. Player One, but not Player Two, is informed of nature's choice. The players choose actions which are commonly and immediately observable, and this situation is repeated an infinite number of times, but with nature's choice of k fixed from the start. The payoffs to both player are determined both by what the two players do and by nature's choice. If the payoffs to the players are determined by the limit behaviour of the average payoffs, a infinitely repeated undiscounted game of incomplete information on one side has been described (Aumann and Maschler 1995) , and the existence of their equilibria was established by Simon, Spiez, and Torunczyk (1995) . We introduce the following game variation. There are finitely many non-negative values λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . , λ n with 0 < n 1 λ i = λ < 1 so that the payoff at the ith stage is weighted according to λ i and the undiscounted infinitely repeated game is weighted according to 1 − λ. Does such a game have a Nash equilibrium?
The above question was posed by A. Neyman (2016) , and our initial response to his question was " definitively not!" The proof of equilibrium existence for a game with a finite tree structure and perfect recall uses fixed point theory, through the original proof of Nash equilibria (Nash 1950 ) and the application of Kuhn's Theorem (1953) . However the proof of equilibrium existence for the undiscounted infinitely repeated game uses a covering theorem that has similarity with the Borsuk-Ulam Theorem (and yet neither implies nor is implied by the Borsuk-Ulam Theorem). Why should there be a synthesis of these two very different proofs?
We answer A. Neyman's question in the affirmative. We make no synthesis of the two proofs, rather we apply properties of the equilibria of the infinitely repeated games to the finite stage game. To answer this question we introduce a new equilibrium concept, called a myopic equilibrium.
What is the main problem with understanding the strategic aspects of finitely many initial stages followed by an infinite stage game? Lets simplify the problem, so that λ 1 = λ = 1 3 states could have very different payoff structures, one would expect large initial payoff advantages for Player One through actions that are dependent on the states of nature. But by doing so, Player One could reveal too much about the state, as the 2 3 majority of the payoff comes from the following stages. Both using her information too much and not at all seem to be foolish options for Player One. There is a delicate give and take between the initial choices of Player One at the different state and the conditional probabilities on the states that these choices induce.
By a pure strategy of Player One on the first stage we mean a determination of an initial action dependent on the state of nature, so that if I is her set of actions then there are |I| |K| different pure strategies for the first stage. By a mixed strategy of Player One on the first stage we mean a probability distribution over those pure strategies. Lets assume that there is a subset of the equilibrium payoffs of the infinitely repeated game that change continuously with the conditional probability distribution on the states of nature. Keeping with the idea that λ = λ 1 , we could define a game where on the first stage Player One chooses a mixed strategy for herself, Player Two chooses a mixed strategy for himself (necessarily state independent), followed by a payoff determined by the initial stage and an equilibrium payoff associated with the induced conditional probability on the states of nature. For any fixed mixed strategy of Player Two, the payoff for Player One will not in general be concave as a function of her mixed strategies. As there are many games that don't have any equilibrium when such payoff functions are not concave (see later example), we anticipated that the composite game of Neyman's question would fail to have an equilibrium.
On closer examination, we discovered that replacing a mixed strategy of Player One with another mixed strategy of the same player was not the correct model of strategic deviation for these games. If Player One is committed to some mixed strategy on the first stage for which every action is played with large positive probability at some state of nature, then no matter what Player One does on that first stage there is no appearence of a strategic deviation. No matter what, Player Two will continue to interpret the future actions of Player One according to a putative commitment to that mixed strategy. Rather than punishing observable deviation it is necessary that any advantage from one action is properly offset by a subsequent disadvantage on the following stages, and that this holds simultaneously for all states of nature. We will see that the required equilibrium property leads directly to the definition of a myopic equilibrium.
The myopic equilibrium concept was formulated to solve Neyman's problem, as explained above. Its main application in this paper is broader, to games trees where information is incomplete. It is intriguing that in order to prove that a certain game has a Nash equilibrium, it was necessary to formulate a new equilibrium concept that can differ greatly from the Nash equilibrium concept. Because we don't know in what other contexts the myopic equilibrium concept can be applied, we present the concept independently from its origin with repeated games of incomplete information on one side.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the concept of myopic equilibria and prove their existence when the payoffs are continuous as functions of the strategy spaces. In the following section we define a truncated game tree and prove that all composite games from truncated game trees with certain structures have equilibria. In the concluding section we answer the question of A. Neyman and speculate on further applications.
An alternative equilibrium concept
Nash equilibria are understood in terms of strategies that are best replies to themselves. A best reply is a strategy of a player that can replace that player's existing strategy and maximize the payoff for that player. Usually one assumes that the set of strategies of a player is a compact and convex set and that, given fixed strategies of the other players, the payoff to that player is affine in its set of strategies. If one assumes that the payoff function is concave in that player's strategies, the mathematics is similar, since optimal responses (existent from the compactness of the strategy set) are realized on a convex subset. If the payoff function to a player is only continuous with respect to his or her strategies, one would not expect there to be a Nash equilibrium, which can demonstrated with the simplest of examples (see below).
The idea that a strategy space is compact and convex comes initially from the assumption that it is the convex span of a discrete set of actions. We keep the assumption that there is a discrete set of actions and the strategy spaces are the probabilistic convex hulls of these actions and make precise our definition of a myopic equilibrium in this context (though it could be generalized to a compact set of actions using support sets).
Let N be a finite set of players, and for each n ∈ N let I n be a finite set of actions. Let ∆ = n∈N ∆(I n ) be the strategy space for all the players. For every n ∈ N and i ∈ I n there is a function f n i : ∆ → R. We say that σ ∈ ∆ is a myopic equilibrium if for every n ∈ N and every i in I n with σ n (i) > 0 it follows that f n i (σ) = max j∈In f n j (σ). How does the myopic equilibrium concept compare with the conventional way to define a game and the conventional Nash equilibrium concept?
With the myopic equilibrium concept there are |I n | different payoffs for Player n, one for each of this player's actions, and they are functions of the strategy space ∆. From these payoffs, one can define a functions g n from ∆ to R for each player n in the canonical way, by g n (σ) := i∈In σ n (i)f n i (σ). Such functions are not necessarily affine or concave in the strategies of a player. Starting with such functions g n , there will always be at least one way to define corresponding functions f n i for the i ∈ I n that so induce the g n as above, namely to define f n i (σ) to be g n (σ) for every i ∈ I n . By defining the f n i in this way every point in ∆ is a myopic equilibrium, and that is not interesting. The interest in myopic equilibria lies entirely with how the payoffs are defined for the individual actions. One must guarantee minimally that whenever σ calls for Player n to choose an action j ∈ I n with certainty it follows that f n j (σ) must equal g n (σ), but beyond that there will be many ways to define the f n j . If the payoffs for all players are mulilinear functions, e.g. defined through multi-dimensional matrices, one could say also that there are |I n | different payoffs for each player n, defined however on the smaller set j∈N \{n} ∆(I j ) for each choice of action in I n . In this special case, when the payoff to each player is defined in the conventional multi-linear way, a myopic equilibrium is the same as a Nash equilibrium. But when the payoffs to a player are not so defined, the two equilibrium concepts can differ greatly, as we see in the following examples.
There is a weakly related concept of local equilibrium, a member σ of ∆ such that for every n the stragegy σ n of player n defines a local maximum of this player's payoff function. See C. Biasi and T. Monis (2013) for such an alternative concept in the context of differentiable payoff functions. However this concept of local equilibrium is still based on functions g n defined on ∆, without necessarily seperate functions f n i defined for each action, as described above.
Look at the following simple example, based on the 2 × 2 matrix A = 1 −1 −1 1 and representing the conventional zero-sum matching pennies game with two players and two actions. From this simple game create a non-zero-sum game in the following way. If (p, 1 − p) is the mixed strategy of Player One and (q, 1 − q) is the mixed strategy of Player Two (probabilistic choices for the two pure actions), let the payoff of Player One be (p, 1 − p)A(q, 1 − q) t + max(p, 1 − p) and let the payoff of Player Two be
It is easy to see that there would be no Nash equilibrium in the usual sense of best replies, as in response to any mixed strategy of the other player a payoff of 1 could be obtained by choosing with certainty one or the other action, and yet a payoff of 1 could not be obtained by both players simultaneously (as the sum of their payoffs being at least 2 is possible only if both chose some action with certainty and then one of the players would have a payoff of no more than 0). One can also show that this game does not have local equilibria as described above. Now define the payoff from an action i = 1, 2 of Player One as e i A(q, 1 − q) t + max(p, 1 − p), where e 1 = (1, 0) and e 2 = (0, 1). Do the same for Player Two: his payoff is −(p, 1 − p)Ae t i + max(q, 1 − q). Given that both p and q are fixed at ) distribution as the accidental result of a flip of the coin that does not change the probability by which that choice is made.
To demonstrate further the fundamental difference in equilibrium concepts, look at the following one-person optimization example where there is both a Nash equilibrium and a myopic equilibrium, but they are very different. Our single player Piers wants to vote for Donald Trump, but is deeply embarassed by the desire to do so. Behaviour in the voting booth is secret, however the voting intension of Piers before entering the voting booth is not secret (at least from his wife and closest friends) and this influences the utility of his behaviour. Let us assume that p is the probability that Piers will vote for Trump and that Piers loses 5p in utility through that voting intention, regardless of what he actually does. All things being equal, regardless of the value of p, in the voting booth there is an advantage of 1 to vote for Trump over Clinton. Without loss of generality, lets assume that once in the voting booth the utility of voting for Trump and Clinton is 1 − 5p and −5p respectively. Regardless of the probability p, voting for Trump is always preferable to voting for Clinton, which makes for one unique myopic equilibrium, namely a certain vote for Trump (p = 1). Define the payoff function on the probability simplex in the way outlined above -as a function of p, the expected utility to Piers would be p(1 − p) + (1 − p)(−5p) = −4p. The unique optimal payoff as a function of p would be 0 obtained at p = 0, meaning a certain vote for Clinton (and this defines the unique Nash equilibrium). However the certain vote for Trump, the unique myopic equilibrium, results in an expected payoff of −4. We see also that a myopic equilibrium is not necessarily a local maximum.
The distinction between myopic equilibria and Nash equilibria for one player games can exist when neither occur at the boundary of the probability simplex. Now we assume, for whatever reason, that the embarassment of wanting to vote for Trump disappears when one actually votes for Clinton. Following this idea, the utility for voting for Trump and Clinton could be 1 − 5p and 0, respectively. As a problem of optimization, the expected utility of
2 , a strictly concave function with a unique maximal solution. By taking the derivative and setting it to zero, one discovers that the value is maximized at p = 1 10 (the unique myopic maximum and Nash equilibrium) for the value of , where both the utility of voting for Clinton and voting for Trump are equal and are equal to 0. Now we show that myopic equilibria always exist, as long as we require that the payoff functions are continuous.
Lemma 1: If the f n i are continuous functions, then there exists a myopic equilibrium.
Proof: As ∆ is a compact space, with N and all the I n finite, there is a bound B > 0 for all the differences of the values f n i . For every σ ∈ ∆, n ∈ N and i ∈ I n define r n (σ) :
are continuous functions on ∆, φ is also a continuous function on ∆. As the sum i∈In φ(σ) n (i) remains equal to 1 and d n i (σ) never exceeds σ n (i), φ maps ∆ back to ∆. As ∆ is a convex and compact subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space, by Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem the function φ has a fixed point σ ∈ ∆. Assume that σ is not a myopic equilibrium. That would mean that there is some n ∈ N and some j ∈ I n such that σ n (j) > 0 and f n j (σ) < r n (σ) and likewise there is some i ∈ I n such that f
n (i) > σ n (i) and therefore σ could not have been a fixed point.
.
The myopic equilibrium concept is amenable to the argument of the KohlbergMertens Structure Theorem. Though the following lemma is not used later in this article, we believe it will be essential to further applications of the myopic equilibrium concept.
Lemma 2: Let W be a finite dimensional vector space of continuous functions defined on ∆ = n∈N ∆(I n ) with values in R n∈N In , represented in each coordinate as w n i with i ∈ I n for any w ∈ W . Assume that W contains all the constant functions, where a constant is an assignment of the same vector in R n∈N In to every choice of σ ∈ ∆. Let E be the subset of W × ∆ such that (w, σ) is in E if and only if σ is a myopic equilibrium of w. Then there exists a continuous function φ : W → W × ∆ such that the image of φ is E and between E and W the function φ is a homeomophism. Furthermore, using the uniform norm (with the barycentres of each ∆(I n ) playing the rule of the origin in ∆), for every bounded set B ⊆ E the set φ −1 (B) is bounded and vice versa for each bounded set C ⊂ W the set φ(C) is bounded.
Proof: We follow the original proof of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) . For every choice of n and i ∈ I n we consider v n i (w) defined by v n i (w) = ∆ w n i (σ)dσ where the measure defining the integration is the product measure over the n ∈ N, such that for each n the measure on ∆(I n ) is the uniform distribution. DefineW to be the vector subspace of W such that this intergration is zero with respect to every choice of n and i ∈ I n . For every
In and σ : R n∈N In → ∆ in the following way. For each n ∈ N the value t n (r) ∈ R is defined by t n (r) := min σ n ∈∆(In) max i∈In r n i − σ(r) n i and σ(r) n is that unique element in ∆(I n ) where the value t n (r) is so obtained (by reducing the largest value, then reducing the two largest values, and so on, also a continuously defined process). Define s by s n i (r) := r n i − σ(r) n i for each n and i ∈ I n . Define ρ :W × R n∈N In →W × R n∈N In by ρ(w, r) = (w, s(r) −w(σ(r)).
The function φ maps W to E and the continuous inverse of φ on E is z −1 • ψ(w, σ) (which is also well defined on all of W × ∆). Lastly we prove the continuity at the point of infinity for both φ and its inverse on E. By the definition of φ and that this property is true of ρ, it suffices to show the same property for the function z. If ||w|| ∞ ≥ C then either |m(w)
for some choice of σ, n, and i. In the other direction, if either |m(w)
. In the former case there is a difference of at least B between m(w) n i (σ) and some m(w)
. In the latter case, |v n i (w)| ≥ B for some n, i implies that |w n i (σ)| ≥ B for σ chosen to be that defined by the barycentres.
Games Trees and Incomplete Information
We have to modify the concept of a finite game tree so that the end points of the game are states for a continuation process, be it a follow-up game or something else. We call this modification a truncated game tree. It involves removing the final payoff from what conventionally is defined to be a game tree. The term is justified because any shorter truncation of a truncated game tree is also a truncated game tree. With our application, instead of a payoff determined by the end point there is a continuation payoff determined by the induced conditional probability distribution on the end points known in common, (which could be interpreted as in terms of a subgame). But these continuation payoffs and their relationship to the conditional probabilities are exogenous to the truncated game tree.
The main inspiration is any game for which all players observe all actions taken, however they don't observe the decision process behind those actions. The distinction can be strong with games of incomplete information, where a player can posess a secret and makes its behaviour dependent on that secret. As with poker, though one observes completely the behaviour of other players, it is the relationship between their private knowledge and their behaviour that one needs to understand as a player.
Let there be a finite set N of players. There is a finite directed graph G = (V, V ). The vertices V can be broken down into two types, nodes and end points. Included in the nodes is a unique vertex r called the root from which all paths of arrows start. E is the set of end points and every path of arrows starts at the root and ends at an end point, with each end point determining a unique such path of arrows. The set D of nodes is the subset V \E and these are the vertices (except for the root r) to which comes exactly one arrow and from which, without loss of generality, come at least two distinct arrows.
For each player n ∈ N there is a subset D n ⊆ D such that ∀i = n D i ∩D n = ∅. Define D 0 to be the set D\(∪ n∈N D n ). Usually with game trees, to every player n ∈ N there is a partition P n of the set D n . But for the truncated game trees we assume that P n is a partition of D n ∪ E for every n ∈ N with the additional property that every W ∈ P n is contained either in D n or E.
For every W ∈ P n with W ⊆ D there is a corresponding set of actions A n W such that there is a bijective relationship between A n W and the arrows leaving every v ∈ W . For every v ∈ D 0 there is a probability distribution p v on the arrows leaving the node v, and therefore also on the nodes following directly after v in the tree.
At any node v ∈ W ∈ P n only the player n is making any decision, and this decision determines completely which vertex follows v. At the nodes v in V 0 nature is making a decision, according to p v , concerning which vertex follows v. If the game is at the node v ∈ D n and v ∈ W ∈ P n then Player n is informed that the node is in the set W and that player has no additional information, so that inside W player n cannot distinguish between nodes within W .
Notice that any simultaneous move game can be so modeled, by choosing any order of players and giving all players indescrete partitions.
For each n ∈ N let P E n be the induced partition on E, meaning P E n := {W ∈ P n | W ⊆ E}. Let P := ∧ n∈N P E n be the join partition on E, meaning the finest partition such that for every n ∈ N every member of P E n is contained in some member of P. The partition P corresponds to the concept of common knowledge, meaning that a member C ∈ P is what the players know in common whenever e ∈ C is the resulting end point. If there is a continuation game, the corresponding set C ∈ P defines the appropriate subgame. Now we define a new payoff structure from the truncated game tree and continuation payoffs.
By a correspondence F : X →→ Y we mean any subset F of X × Y . It is non-empty if F (x) = ∅ for all x ∈ X. The domain of a correspondence F is the subset {x | F (x) = ∅} and the image of F is the subset {y | y ∈ F (x) for some x ∈ X}. The correspondence has convex images if for every x the set F (x) is convex. The correspondence is upper-semi-continuous if F is a closed subset of X × Y .
For any C ∈ P there is a correspondence F C ⊆ ∆(C)×R C×N of continuation payoffs. As it is finite, we perceive E as a compact space. For every n ∈ N let g n : E ×R → R be a continuous real function that is strictly increasing in R. The usual application will be g n (e, t) = λr n e + (1 − λ)t for some 0 < λ < 1 where r e ∈ R N is a payoff vector associated with the end point e. Likewise, if the correspondence were constant, that is F C (p) = F C (p ′ ) for all p, p ′ ∈ ∆(C), the payoff structure would not be different from that of a conventional game tree.
For every player n ∈ N let S n be the finite set of pure decision strategies of the players in the truncated game tree, by which we mean a function that decides, at every set W in P n such that W is also contained in D n , deterministically which member of A n W should be chosen. If each such A n W has cardinality l and there are k such sets then the cardinality of S n is l k .
For every σ ∈ ∆ := n∈N ∆(S n ) and C ∈ P let p σ (C) be the probability of reaching C through σ. If this probability is positive, define P σ (·|C) to be the conditional probability on C induced by σ. For every given σ ∈ ∆, n ∈ N and s ∈ S n call the value f n s (σ) proper if for every C ∈ P there is some q C ∈ ∆(C) and some t ∈ F C (q C ) such that f n s (σ) is the expectation of g n (e, t e,n ) according to s and σ applied to the players other than n, and if C is given positive probability by σ then q C (e) = P σ (e|C) for all e ∈ C. Proper means that the continuation payoff corresponds to the conditional probability distribution, given that it is well defined. When the conditional probability is not well defined, meaning that a set C ∈ P has reached that shouldn't have been reached according to σ, the continuation payoff corresponds to some distribution on C. That zero probability of reaching C according to σ implies that somebody has acted in an inappropriate way and the use of such a continuation payoff could be interpreted as punishment. However there are problems with seeing such a continuation payoff as the punishment of some particular player, and this is discussed below.
What the players observe in common is some set C in P. Given that they know each other's strategies, the choice of σ in ∆, they know in common a conditional probability distribution on elements contained in the set C in P. This doesn't mean that each player knows only this about the payoffs, either his or her payoff or those of others. A player may learn much more, including potentially exactly which e ∈ C will be reached for any given C ∈ P. In such an event the player evaluates his or her actions according to that exact knowledge of the end point e, however knowing also that the payoff at e is determined by the induced common knowledge distribution on C. There is a similarity with poker, in which a player may know that he or she has the winning hand, but that player's betting strategy reflects an understanding of what other players believe concerning the strengths of their hands.
The truncated game tree has eventual perfect monitoring if for every distinct a, b members of A n W and for every j ∈ N the choices of a and b leads to a different member of P E j and it has perfect monitoring if both a and b never lead to any member of P j which can be reached after any point of the set W . With eventual perfect monitoring, there is common knowledge at the end points of all the actions taken by all the players, meaning that any difference in any action taken lands the players into different members of P.
The truncated game tree has perfect recall for a player n if all paths leading to a set W ∈ P n , including all such W ⊂ E, pass through the same previous partition sets in P n in the same order and without repetition (including no previous occurance of W ).
Although the following theorem is stated without the assumption of perfect recall, it would be difficult to understand its relevance without this assumption. By Kuhn's Theorem (1953) , a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies can be translated to an equilibrium in behaviour strategies, meaning for each player n and each set W ∈ P n a mixed strategy for the set W . The theorem is also stated without the assumption of eventual perfect monitoring, though it is easier to understand in that context.
Theorem 1:
If for every C ∈ P the correspondence F C ⊆ ∆(C) × R C×N is an upper-semi-continous convex-valued and non-empty correspondence then there is a σ and values f n s (σ) for every n ∈ N and s ∈ S n that are proper and define a myopic equilibrium.
Proof: Let ǫ > 0 be given and let B be a positive quantity larger than any payoff from the correspondences F C . For each C ∈ P there is a function φ C : ∆(C) → R C×N that is a continous ǫ approximation of F C .
If p σ (C), the probability of reaching C with σ, is at least 2ǫ then define
. For every σ ∈ ∆ and s ∈ S n definef n s (σ) to be the expectation of g n e, λ σ (C)φ e,n C (P σ (·|C)) + (1 − λ σ (C))2B where the distribution on e and the containing C are determined by the choice of s ∈ S n . Notice that thef n s (σ) are continuous in σ (the only potential problem being that the conditional probability on C ∈ P is not continuous as p σ (C) approaches zero, a problem eliminated by the introduction of λ σ (C)).
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , with every ǫ i approximation of the correspondences F C by Lemma 1 there is a myopic equilibrium σ i for the above definedf n s (σ i ). Let σ be a cluster point of the corresponding myopic equilibria σ i , with corresponding clusters point of valuesf n s (σ) and corresponding cluster points of continuation payoffs used to define thef n s (σ i ). We need to define proper values f n s (σ). Any C reached with positive probability by σ is reached with more than 2ǫ i for all eventually large enough i, and therefore if s ∈ S n is given positive weight by σ then the corresponding payoffsf n s (σ i ) for large enough i are the expectation (with respect to s and σ) of the functions g n where the λ σ (C) used to define the g n are all equal to 1. In this case we define the f n s (σ) to be thef n s (σ) and the corresponding t ∈ F C (P σ (C)) to be likewise clusters of the vectors used (which are in F C (P σ (C) due to the use of continuous functions that approximate the F C ).
If s ∈ S n should not be chosen with positive probability according to σ, we define f n s (σ) according to g n (e, t e,n ), where the t ∈ F C are the cluster points of any continuation payoffs used in defining thef n s (σ i ) but without the aid of the λ σ i (C). If some C * ∈ P is never reached by any of these refinements of subsequences, we know that 2B was used in defining the appropriate subsequence of thef n s (σ i ) and we assign any continuation payoffs in C * that come from any distribution on C * . Once the 2B is removed, when applicable, the resulting payoffs do not increase, and therefore f n s (σ) ≤ f n s ′ (σ) for any s ′ ∈ S n used with positive probability according to σ (with equality between all such s ′ ).
The proof of the above theorem has a resemblance to "trembling hand" arguments (Selten 1975) , however the mechanism for giving small probabilities to potentially undesirable actions is very different.
It would be tempting to define the continuation payoffs from the F C as those from a game, that is payoffs generated by strategies. However we would then require for all e ∈ C ∈ P some determination of a payoff for each player n ∈ N, including the case of some W ∈ P E n given zero probability by the relevant strategy σ. There is a problem with defining a player whose presence in the game has zero probability and yet receives a payoff that could potentially torpedo the equilibrium property. On the other hand, we did need to define such payoffs, as we had to consider the payoff consequences of decision functions chosen with zero probability according to σ and make sure that they did not profit the player in question over those decision functions given positive probability.
Also tempting would be to interpret the landing at a C ∈ P that is given zero probability by the σ ∈ ∆ as the trigger of some punishment of a player. With two-player games, if only one player had deviated, indeed that player can be held responsible for bringing the play to the set C. But with three or more players, it may be impossible to obtain common knowledge of which player had brought the game to this forbidden subset. Imagine the following example; there are three players i = 1, 2, 3 and each player has three strategies, left, right, and centre, and each player is required to play only centre. If all three players choose centre, then all three players are informed of this fact. If Player i chooses left then Player i − 1 (modulo 3) is informed of this fact and if Player i chooses right then Player i + 1 is informed of this fact; and in either case if Player i was the only disobedient player, the only information that the third other player receives is that not all three players had chosen centre. Lets assume that Player 1 discovers that one of the other players was disobedient, but not which one. There are two possibilities, either Player 2 played right or Player 3 played left. Players 2 and 3 could both maintain that they were not disobedient. The effective punishment of Player 3 may be very beneficial to Player 2 which could place an otherwise sound equilibrium in doubt, as then Player 2 could deviate and then claim that it was Player 3 who deviated. With two players, this problem doesn't appear, because the two could punish each other. With the above theorem, there is an implicit punishment through the choice of some continuation payoff for all the players, but no explicit punishment strategies, which may prove problematic.
We could have stated the theorem so that the correspondence of payoffs applies only to all distributions that can be generated by strategies. However the distributions generated by strategies is a closed set, and a non-empty, upper-semi-continuous and convex valued correspondence on a closed subset of distributions can be extended to one defined on all distributions. This is because continuous functions can be so extended, and so the same holds for u.s.c. non-empty convex valued correspondences.
Games of Incomplete Information on One Side
We return to Neyman's question. There is a finite set K of states of nature. Nature chooses a state k ∈ K according to a commonly known probability on K, and Player One, but not Player Two, is informed of nature's choice. The finite sets of moves for the players are the same for all states, the set I for Player One and the set J for Player Two. After each stage of play, both players are informed of each others' moves. The play is repeated indefinitely, and the chosen state remains constant throughout play.
For every state k ∈ K let A k and B k be the payoff matrices of the two players with I indexing the rows and J indexing the columns. The entries a k i,j and b k i,j in A k and B k are the payoffs to the first and second players respectively. given that the state is k, the move of Player One is i, and the move of Player Two is j.
The strategies of the game are the same as those described in Simon, Spiez, and Torunczyk (1995) and Aumann and Maschler (1995) , though the payoffs are defined differently. For the sake of completeness, we describe the strategy and payoff structures below.
A behavior strategy of Player One is an infinite sequence α = (α 1 , α 2 , . . . ) such that for each l α l is a mapping from K × (I × J) l−1 to ∆(I).
A behavior strategy of Player Two is an infinite sequence β = (β 1 , β 2 , . . . ) such that for each l β l is a mapping from (I × J) l−1 to ∆(I).
Let I and J be the set of behavior strategies of Players One and Two, respectively. Define the set of finite play-histories of length l to be H l := K × (I × J) l , and define H k l to be the subset {k} × (I × J) l .
For any fixed k ∈ K, every pair of behavior strategies α ∈ I and β ∈ J induces a probability measure µ l,k α,β on H k l , and with the initial probability p 0 such a pair induces a probability measure µ l α,β on H l . To define the payoffs, for both players i = 1, 2 there is a finite sequence λ 
An equilibrium is a pair of behavior strategies α ∈ I and β ∈ J such that for every k ∈ K
exist and for every pair α * ∈ I and β * ∈ J
Such games as described above we call Neyman games (to distinguish them from the conventional infinitely repeated games introduced by Aumann and Maschler) .
With regard to the infinitely repeated game introduced by Aumann and Maschler, Aumann and Maschler (1995) , with the help of R. Stearns, introduced a solution concept known as a joint plan. For any p ∈ ∆(K) define a * (p) to be the value of the zero-sum game defined by the matrix A(p) := k∈K p k A k , where p k is the probability that p gives to the state k ∈ K. Likewise define b * (p) to be the value of the zero-sum defined by the matrix B(p) :
and define γB likewise. A joint plan for an initial probability p 0 is
(1) a finite subset of probabilities V ⊆ ∆(K) such that the convex hull of V contains the initial probability p 0 ,
for some finite n a finite set T ⊂ I n of signals in bijective relation to the set V and a state dependent choice of an s ∈ T performed by Player One such that the signal s ∈ T implies by Bayes rule a conditional probability on the set K equal to its corresponding member in V .
(4) if the signal s chosen corresponds to v ∈ V , an agreement between the players to play through the rest of the game a deterministic sequence of pairs of actions ((i 1 , j 1 ), (i 2 , j 2 ), . . . ) such that in the limit the distribution γ v is obtained, and (5) punishment strategies of the two players to be implemented in the event that a player does not adhere to the agreed upon sequence of actions.
Aumann and Maschler showed that a joint plan describes an equilibrium of the undiscounted game if there is an indivually rational y ∈ R K such that for every v ∈ V the following holds:
If necessary, Player One is punished according to a strategy of Player Two such that simultaneously for every k ∈ K Player One is held down to no more than y k . This ability of Player Two is based on a theorem of D. Blackwell (1956) . Now we apply Theorem 1 to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The above question of A. Neyman is answered in the affirmative, meaning that every Neyman game has an equilibrium.
Proof: We have to define the truncated game tree, the mixed strategy space ∆, the partitions P E i on the end points of this tree, the continuation vectors F C for every C ∈ P E 1 ∧ P E 2 = P E , and the payoff functions g i defined on the edge points E and the continuation vectors from the correspondences F C .
The first n stages of a Neyman game define the truncated game tree Γ n for which E := K × (I × J) n are the end points. The truncated game tree has are 2n + 1 stages of play, the first stage being Nature's choice and the 2n following stages being alternations between Player One's and Player Two's choices of actions. The first to move is Nature, choosing some k ∈ K. After Nature's choice, Player One has a partition consisting of |K| different singletons, respresenting a complete knowledge of Nature's choice. This is followed by an action of Player Two, for which Player Two has only one partition member for this stage of play, meaning that Player Two has no information on which to base his choice of action. For every m < n, at the conclusion of the mth stage (meaning that 2m + 1 actions have been performed, m by both Players One and Two and the first by Nature) Player One's partition consist of the singletons of K × (I × J) m , which are used to determine Player One's m + 1st action, followed by partition elements for Player Two (to determine the his m + 1st action) defined by the different members of (I × J) m (meaning that Player Two saw the first m actions of Player One but not the m + 1st action). The partition P E 1 on E for Player One consists of the |K| · |I| l · |J| l many singletons (meaning that at the conclusion of the truncated game tree Player Two does learn what Player One did in the last stage of that tree). The partition P E 2 on E for the second player consists of the sets of size |K| of the form K × {x} for all x ∈ (I × J) n . The partition P E = P E 1 ∧ P E 2 defining the common knowledge is the same as P E 2 the partition corresponding to the second player. There is a one-to-one correspondence between every C ∈ P E and every sequence (i 1 , j 2 , . . . , i n , j n ) of moves by both players. Kuhn's Theorem (1953) allows us to represent the behaviour strategies of the above defined truncated game tree Γ n equivalently as mixed strategies, that is probability distributions on the pure decision functions of the players. Let S 1 and S 2 be the set of pure decision functions of Player One and Player Two respectively. The space of mixed strategies of the truncated game tree is ∆ := ∆(S 1 ) × ∆(S 2 ). Every choice of (σ, τ ) ∈ ∆ combined with a sequence i 1 , j 1 , . . . , i l , j l of actions taken with positive probability induces through the Bayes rule a conditional probability on K. As stated above, the sequence i 1 , j 1 , . . . , i l , j l defines uniquely a member C in P E and P σ (·, C) is that conditional probability, whereby it does not matter whether we see this as a distribution on the set {(k, i 1 , j 1 , . . . , i n , j n ) | k ∈ K} or on the set K itself.
We define F C : ∆(C) → R C×{1,2} such that for every p ∈ ∆(K) the set F C (p) is the convexification of the joint plan equilibria corresponding to the initial probability distribution ∆(K). For every e ∈ E, which corresponds to a history h = (k, i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n , j n ) ∈ H n , also a member of some C ∈ P E , and some continuation vector v ∈ R C×{1,2} , define the payoff g i (e, v) to be
To apply Theorem 1, we need to know that F C so defined is u.s.c., non-empty, and convex valued. With regard to the conventional infinitely repeated undiscounted games, by Simon, Spiez, and Toruncyzk (1995) joint plan equilibria exist for every probability in the probability simplex ∆(K) and the equality and inequality conditions defining them imply that they are upper-semicontinuous as a corrspondence (indeed satisfying the stronger condition of "spanning", Simon, Spiez, and Toruncyzk 2002) . It follows from Hart (1985) that equilibrium payoffs are generated by convexifying the payoffs from joint plan equilibria corresponding to any fixed probability p ∈ ∆(K). As the vector space of payoffs is finite dimensional, the point-wise convexification of an upper-semi-continuous correspondence is also upper-semi-continuous.
From a myopic equilibria, a Nash equilibrium of the Neyman game is defined in the following way. The players choose pure decision functions in S 1 and S 2 according to σ and τ for the first n moves followed by the appropriate corresponding equilibrium of the undiscounted game whose distribution on the initial states in K is that determined by σ, τ , the initial sequence i 1 , j 1 , . . . , i n , j n ), given that this initial sequence is given positive probability. If the two players choose pure decision functions for the first n stages that should be chosen with positive probability, then for every k ∈ K the sequence of initial actions k, i 1 , j 1 , . . . , i n , j n will be given positive probability also. By Theorem 1, for each player there will be no difference in payoff expectation between one such pure decision function and another. On the other hand, the choice of a pure decision function by either player that should be chosen with zero probability will result in the same or an inferior expected payoff. And that is sufficient to describe an equilibrium, once mixed strategies are converted to behaviour strategies via Kuhn's Theorem (1953) .
Dropping the condition of perfect monitoring, we suspect that a proof of equilibrium existence is straightforward as long as Player One has the ability to send distinct non-revealing signals, the same sufficient condition for equilibria described in Simon, Spiez, and Torunczyk (2002) .
Notice that in applying Theorem 1 to the proof of Theorem 2, we don't need to be explicit in the punishment strategy should a player deviate in an observable way. Such a deviation implies that a C ∈ P is reached that shouldn't be reached. An appropriate equilibrium having payoffs sufficiently low does the required punishment.
What if the payoffs were the sum of a discounted evaluation for infinitely many stages and the payoffs from the undiscounted game? From the theorem there will be an ǫ-equilibrum for every positive ǫ, but is there an equilibrium? For the application of Theorem 1, it is not necessary that the payoffs from the initial n stages are related in any way to the payoffs from the following undiscounted game. This is because the first n stages of the game are not relevant to the undiscounted payoff, only relevant is the induced probability distribution on the states K. Arbitrary pairs of games so combined together would have ǫ-equilibria for every ǫ > 0 (by defining the truncated game tree from arbitrarily many initial stages) but not equilibria. The obtaining of good payoffs in one of the two games, either the undiscounted or discounted, would be a distraction for obtaining good payoffs in the other game. Even in the case of the payoffs based on the same payoff matrices (as holds with Neyman games), the performing of the joint lotteries to convexify the payoffs would be a distraction from the process of playing the discounted game. Therefore to demonstrate an equilibrium here would require an extension of Lemma 1 to the "spanning property" of Simon, Spiez, and Toruncyzk (2002) rather than convex valued. Also important, one would have to show that the equilibrium behaviour of the players from an infinite sequence of game tree truncations could define equilibrium play in the undiscounted game.
Though the theorem can deliver powerful results concerning the equilibria of composite games, one does have to be careful that the given continuation payoffs are supported by equilibria of the continuation game. Infinitely repeated games of incomplete information can lack equilibria if one gives to Player Two some very slight information that Player One does not have; such are games of "incomplete information on one and a half sides" (Sorin and Zamir 1985) . Exactly this problem arises because the continuation payoffs of the theorem are determined by a distribution on the set C that is common knowledge, and yet a player may know more than this and choose not to accept any payoff scheme determined by such common knowledge. In the ap-
